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This?paper?analyzes?how?the?incentives?of?regions?differ?from?those?of?nations?when?choosing?a?
supranational? fiscal?arrangement.?Two? types?of?fiscal?arrangements?are?studied:?a?Union?of?nations?
and? a? Federation? of? nations.? Under? the? Union,? there? is? full? fiscal? integration,? and? under? the?
Federation,?there?is?only?partial?fiscal?integration?and?partial? insurance?against?local?risks.?We?show?
that?the?claim?that?regions?have?stronger?incentives?than?nations?to?form?a?supranational?Union?rather?
than?a?Federation?might?be?true?only?in?the?case?where?regions?have?strong?incentives?to?be?part?of?a?
centralized?nation.
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1. Introduction
In the last decades Europe has gone through a process of increased integration among
nations and, at the same time, many of those nations have been implementing reforms that
increase the autonomy of their regions. In Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom
there are political parties asking for more autonomy (and even secession) of regions. The* Correspond
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common view that the recent emergence of nationalistic parties is the response of the rich
regions to their bexploitationQ by the poor ones is not completely convincing. This being
because such abuses have a long history.1 An alternative interpretation is that, with unified
markets, rich regions have more interaction with the rest of Europe and less with other
regions in their countries. A larger market increases the set of possible coalitions with
whom regions can interact and might cause the break-up of the old coalitions.2
That more integration can induce more autonomy is a phenomenon that has been
studied in the theoretical literature.3 A theoretical question that has not been studied is
whether increasing autonomy of the regions can reinforce or not the integration process. In
other words, whether giving to the regions enough autonomy and political decision power
would result in an agreement implying different levels of integration than those resulting in
economies where centralized nations were the decision makers.
In?this?paper?we?focus?on?how?the?incentives?of?regions?differ?from?those?of?nations?when?
choosing?a?type?of?common?fiscal?arrangement.?We?will?consider?a?very?simple?but,?we?hope,?
relevant?and?clarifying?environment?with?only?two?nations.?Each?nation?will?consist?of?two?
regions.?Two? types? of? fiscal? arrangements?will? be? considered:?One? implying?more? fiscal?
integration? than? the? other.?We? call? them? (following? Bucovetsky,? 1998) a Union? and? a?
Federation.4?Under?a?Union?the?transfers?from?poor?areas?to?rich?areas?are?such?that?all?the?
participants?end?up?with?the?same?income?level.?Thus,?this?type?of?unitary?fiscal?arrangement?
would?bring?full?insurance?against?local?shocks?for?all?the?nations?(and?for?the?regions?forming?
the?nations).5?Under?a?Federation,?however,?there?are?no?transfers?from?poor?to?rich?areas?but?
citizens?are? free? to?migrate?within? the? area? forming? the?Federation.?Thus,?under? a? federal?
system,?risk-sharing?is?achieved?by?means?of?migration?from?poor?areas?to?richer?areas.?Since?
migration?is?costly?a?federal?system?provides?only?partial?insurance?against?local?risks.6
We also consider two types of institutional scenarios depending on whether the decision
makers are the nations or the regions. In the first case, nations are the relevant political actors
and the regions constituting a nation have no influence on the decision on forming a possible
supranational fiscal arrangement. A nation here is the result of the fiscal and political union of
its two regions and, consequently, the national government represents the aggregated interests
of the citizens from such regions. In the second scenario, regions are seen as the relevant
independent decision makers. This could be the case of some very decentralized countries
where regions enjoy a high degree of economic autonomy and political power. It is often the
case that regions in a decentralized nation, in addition to having their own governments, have
also direct representatives on a national body such as a Senate. In this case, some national
policies, as for example joining a supranational fiscal union, require the approval of the regions.1 However, in many former socialist European economies, those regional differences are more recent. See
Berkowitz?(1997)?for?an?analysis?and?empirical?evidence?of?the?regional?secessionist?pressures?in?those?countries.
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See,? for?example,?Casella? (2001).
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See,? for? instance,?Alesina?and?Spolaroe? (1997)?and?Casella? (2001).
4 However, they do not intend to represent real federations or unions. This is only a way to put names to
agreements implying different fiscal integration levels.
5
We?abstract? from? the?political? risk?discussed,? for? instance,? in?Alesina?and?Perotti? (1998).
6 In?our?model? taxation? is?not?distortionary? and? there? are?no?moral?hazard?problems?of? the? type? analyzed? in?
Persson?and?Tabellini? (1996a,b).?Thus,? tranfers?between?areas?are?not?costly.?This?assumption?can?be? relaxed?as?
long?as?migration? is?more?costly? than? transfers.
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The question we want to explore is whether the institutional scenarios defined above are
important or not to understand the degree of supranational fiscal integration. Put in more
explicit terms, the question is if the degree of fiscal autonomy and political power of regions
is important to determine the type of international fiscal agreement that would be achieved.
One might think that autonomous regions, being smaller economic areas than nations,
are exposed to higher risks and as a consequence have stronger incentives, as compared to
nations, to form a Union. A nation, on the other hand, might prefer the partial insurance
mechanism provided by the Federal system since it faces a lower risk and the full
insurance associated with a supranational Union might be btoo costlyQ. Notice that if a
Union of nations is formed the rich nation will have to give transfers to the poorer nation.
It might happen that the level of such transfers is so high that the rich nation prefers not to
joining the Union and bear the risk of becoming the poorer nation in the future and, in that
case, not receiving transfers from the other nation.
We will show, however, that the previous intuition might be quite misleading. Suppose
that one of the two nations is richer than the other in expected terms and, in the same way,
within each nation one region is richer than the other. Thus, suppose that different nations,
and different regions, each face different idiosyncratic risks. It is true that the regions, as
independent economic areas, might face higher risks than they would if they were a fully
integrated part of a nation. But now the income dispersion among the four regions is also
higher than the income dispersion between the two nations. In this case, the richest region
might find the partial insurance arrangement associated to a Federation more profitable than
a unitary fiscal arrangement and at the same time, were nations the players, both nations
would prefer the full insurance associated with the unitary agreement to the insurance
provided by the federal system. This could happen when the cost of forming a Union, in
terms of the implied expected redistribution, is higher for the richest region – in the case of
fiscally autonomous regions – than for the richest nation – in the case of centralized nations.
The? relevance?of?our?analysis? rests?on? the?assumption? that?nations?(or? regions)?cannot?
obtain?full?insurance?against?idiosyncratic?shocks?in?the?market.?Thus,?in?our?approach,?the?
Union?and? the?Federation?can?be?seen?as? institutions? that?offer? the? risk-sharing? that? is?not?
provided?by? the?market.?We?believe? that,?as?first?pointed?out?empirically?by?Sala-i-Martin?
and?Sachs? (1992)? and? von?Hagen? (1992)?who? evaluate? the? risk-sharing? provided? by? the?
fiscal?system? in? the?US,? this?might?be?seen?as?a? realistic?assumption.77
The?empirical?estimates?of?risk?sharing?via?the?fiscal?system?in?the?US?vary?from?10%?to?13%?in?von?Hagen
(1992)? and? Asdrubali? et? al.? (1996),? to? a? 40%? estimated? by? Sala-i-Martin? and? Sachs? (1992).? In? a? recent?
contribution,?Melitz?and?Zumer?(2002)?explain?this?huge?difference? in? that?Sala-i-Martin?and?Sachs?use?personal?
income?concepts?and?also?a?broad?measure?of?net?transfers,?wheras?von?Hagen?uses?gross?product?concepts?with?a?
narrow?concept?of?net?tranfers.?On?the?other?hand,?Melitz?and?Zumer?contribute?to?this?literature?by?disentangling?
risk?sharing?and?redistribution?via?the?fiscal?system.?Regarding?the?European?Union,?Sorensen?and?Yosha?(1998)?
estimate? that? a? lot? less? risk? sharing? is? achieved?within?countries? in? the?European?Union? than?within? the?United?
States.?On? the? other? hand,?Obstfeld? (1994),? Shiller? and?Athanasoulis? (1995),?Athanasoulis? and? von?Wincoop?
(1998),?and?van?Wincoop?(1999)?provide?empirical?estimations?of?potential?welfare?gains?from?international?and?
interregional? risk-sharing? above? those? not? provided? by? the?market.? Forni? and? Reichlin? (1999)? provide? some?
measures?of?the?potential?insurable?risk?for?the?European?countries.?In?addition?to?these?empirical?papers,?there?are?
many? recent? theoretical?models?where? the?motive? for? integration? is? risk? sharing,? see,? for? instance,?Alesina? and?
Perotti? (1998),?Persson?and?Tabellini? (1996a,b)?and?Wildasin? (1995,?2000).
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One? additional? question? to? assess? the?merit? of? the? analysis? provided? in? this? paper? is?
whether?migration?is,?in?reality,?an?important?way?to?share?risks?among?nations?or?regions.?
Barro? and? Sala-i-Martin? (1991,? 1992)? provide? evidence? of? the? relationship? between?
migration?flows?to?US?states?and?per?capita?income.?Blanchard?and?Katz?(1992)?also?show?
that?migration? is? an? important? insurance? device? against? regional? business? cycle? shocks.?
Eichengreen? (1993)? finds?a? strong? relationship?between?migration?and? the? lagged?growth?
rate?of?wages? in? the?US.
Closely? related? to? this? paper? is? the? approach? taken? by? Bucovetsky? (1998),? who?
compares? the? incentives? for? two? geographic? areas? to? choose? a? federal? state? agreement?
versus?a?unitary?state.?In?this?paper,?geographic?areas?suffer?stochastic?idiosyncratic?shocks?
and?so?the?motive?for?the?agreement? is?to?provide?insurance.?The?important?parameters?to?
take? into? account? are? related? to? risk? aversion,? differences? in? expected? income,? and?
migration?costs.
Neither of the referred papers, however, analyzes the issue considered in our model: the
different incentives between regions and nations regarding supranational fiscal arrange-
ments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the
different type of agreements to be considered. Section 4 shows some results that will be
useful for the proof of the main proposition. Section 5 discusses our main result. Section 6
concludes the paper with some final remarks. Finally an Appendix presents the proofs of
our results.2. The model
Our?model? shares? its?basics? features?with? the?model?developed? in?Bucovetsky? (1998)?
with?the?difference?that?we?will?consider?two?possible?levels?of?decision.?The?national?level?
is? modeled? exactly? as? in? Bucovetsky’s,? but? in? this? paper? each? nation? consists? of? two?
regions?which? face? idiosyncratic? regional? shocks.
We will consider two nations, A and B. A consists of two regions A1 and A2, and B
consists of regions B1 and B2 (sometimes we write Rj to denote the region j of nation R,
ja{1, 2}, Ra{A, B}). We normalize population so that the number of people in each
region is 1/2. So each nation’s total population is 1.
There is uncertainty about the national production level (which will be also given in per
capita terms, given our normalization). It can be either q, if the good state of nature
happens in that nation, or 1 if the bad state occurs, where q N1. We assume that national
production levels are negatively correlated, i.e. if one nation gets the good state of nature
then the other nation obtains the bad state of nature. We make this assumption in order to
concentrate our analysis on the possible risk-sharing advantages of forming a union.8 The
good state of nature occurs in nation A with probability p (so the good state of nature8 Obviously, a more realistic assumption would be that shocks can go in any direction. However, if we do not
consider negatively correlated shocks there would be no point of talking about risk sharing. A more general
assumption that gives the same results would be that on top of the more general shocks there are important shocks
that are negatively correlated.
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occurs in B with probability 1p). We assume that p N1/2 so country A is richer than
country B in expected terms.
We also assume that regional idiosyncratic shocks can happen. These shocks are such
that they add the amount c/2 to the production level in a lucky region and reduce the
production level by c/2 in an unlucky one. We assume that within either nation there is a
perfect negative correlation between the regional shocks so that when region R1 gets a
positive (negative) shock region R2 gets a negative (positive) shock. This implies that a
lucky region in a lucky nation (from now on, in the state HH) will have the total
production
YHH ¼ qþ c
2
:
A unlucky region in a lucky nation (state HL) would have
YHL ¼ q c
2
:
A lucky region in an unlucky nation (state LH) would have
YLH ¼ 1þ c
2
:
And, finally, an unlucky region in an unlucky nation (state LL) would have
YLL ¼ 1 c
2
:
Region R1, Ra{A, B}, is lucky with probability p (so region R2, Ra{A, B}, is lucky
with probability 1p. We assume that pz1/2 so A1 and B1 are the rich regions (in
expected terms) in nations A and B, respectively. We will interpret A1 and B1 as the North
in each nation and A2 and B2 as the South. Note that the probability p is the same in both
nations. These regional production levels are consistent with the national ones defined
previously. Notice that the unlucky region in the lucky nation might have a greater or
lower income (and per capita income) than the lucky region in the unlucky nation.9
It is assumed that in an economy with centralized nations each nation is formed by the
Union of its two regions. In this case, the central government implements the level of
interregional transfers that achieve full equalization of income across regions. Thus, in the
economy with centralized nations, the regional shocks will not be relevant.9 Empirically, the income of the richest region in the South will be greater or lower than the income of the
poorest? region? in? the?North? depending? on? how? the?North? and? South? are? aggregated?within? each? nation.? For?
instance?(see?graph?5.3?in?Esteban,?1994),?in?1989,?(taking?100?as?the?average?per?capita?income?in?the?European?
Union),?40%?of? the?population? in?Spain? lived? in? regions?having?a?per?capita? income?between?110?and?80.?This?
would?be? the?North?of?Spain.?55%?of? the?population?of?France?live? in?regions? that?had?per?capita? income?above?
100.?This?could?be?the?North?of?France?in?our?model.?The?South?of?France?would?be?the?45%?living?in?regions?that?
have?a?per?capita?between?100?and?80? (thus?providing?a?high?degree?of?overlap?with? the?North?of?Spain).?The?
South? of? Spain? would? be? the? 60%? living? in? regions? having? a? per? capita? income? lower? than? 80.? Similar?
considerations?could?be?used?to?construct?the?North?and?South?of?the?respective?Northern?and?Southern?countries.?
However,? in?Greece?and?Portugal,?all? regions?have?per?capita? incomes? lower? than? the?poorest? region? in?several?
Northern?countries.
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We assume that all agents of a given nation or region are identical to each other. In this
case, the preferences of a nation R and the preferences of a region Rj, coincide with the
individual preferences of their members.
(A.1). All regions and nations share the same von Neuman Morgenstern concave utility
function U with per capita income as the argument. This utility function presents constant
relative risk aversion. Thus we can write U xð Þ ¼ x1b
1b ; bN0, where x is per capita
income.10
The total resources in a region are distributed equally among all the residents so that the
per capita income is the same for all of them. Since in a centralized nation the income in
both regions is the same, citizens have no incentives to migrate to the other region in the
nation. Under a decentralized nation with fiscally autonomous regions, however, the two
regions will have different income levels. Thus, in the decentralized case, an agent that
migrates from a poor region to a richer region, within the same nation, would obtain a
higher income than an agent who remains in the poor region. The same thing happens
when migration takes place from the poor region of a nation to a richer region in a different
nation. There is, however, a positive migration cost.
(A.2). There is a constant individual cost cz0 of migrating from one region to another.
This cost is the same whether the migration takes place within a nation or from a region in
a nation to a region in a different nation.
This is clearly a strong assumption but our results are robust to small changes allowing
for lower migration cost within a nation than across nations.11 In fact, we could allow for
large differences in the migration costs as long as the income dispersion between regions is
large enough. Nevertheless, in order to keep things simple, we will assume (A.2)
throughout the paper.
Following?Bucovetsky? (1998)?we?define?a?Federal? fiscal?agreement? (or?a?Federation)?
as? one? in?which? there? is? free?migration? among? the? nations? or? regions? involved,? but? no?
transfers? to? equalize? per? capita? income? among? the? different? areas.? A? Unitary? fiscal?
agreement?(we?also?call?it?a?Union)?is?the?one?in?which?a?central?authority?uses?transfers?to?
equalize?per?capita?income?in?the?different?areas?and,?consequently,?there?is?no?migration.
We will consider two types of environments depending on whether the decision makers
are the regions or the nations. The idea is that, in very centralized nations, where there is
already an economic union among the two regions and a powerful central government, the
decision maker is the bnationQ. In decentralized nations, with high levels of political and
economic regional independence, the decision makers are the regions. The four types of
agreements we analyze are : (i) a union of nations A and B (UN); (ii) a federation of
nations A and B (FN); (iii) a federation of regions A1, A2, B1 and B2 (FR); and (iv) a
union of regions A1, A2, B1 and B2 (UR). In cases i) and ii) the decision makers are the10 This assumption is also made in Bucovetsky.
11 If the cost of migrating to other region within a nation is very small then there is no point in comparing the
economy with regions with the economy with nations. Trivially, free migration with very low migration cost
between regions in a nation will make each of the regions in each nation share (almost) the same income and
therefore they will behave as nations.
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nations meanwhile in cases iii) and iv) the decision makers are the regions. We also
consider the case in which the two nations are separated (S).3. Description of agreements
3.1. Separated nations
When the two nations are separated, we assume that there are neither international
migration flows nor transfers from one nation to the other nation. The expected utility
nation A would obtain in this case is
ESA ¼ pU qð Þ þ 1 pð ÞU 1ð Þ
and the expected utility of nation B is
ESB ¼ 1 pð ÞU qð Þ þ pU 1ð Þ:
These are the minimum utility levels that nations should obtain in order for them to be
willing to participate in any other possible arrangement.
3.2. Global union
Given our assumptions, in a supranational unitary state (consisting of the union of
nations A and B or of the union of regions A1, A2, B1 and B2) the level of transfers is
such that each region would end up with the same per capita income, (q +1)/2 with
certainty. Therefore, the expected utility for each region, or nation, would be
UU ¼ U qþ 1
2
 
:
Thus, under the global union, there is complete sharing of resources and all agents obtain
the same utility.
3.3. Federation of nations
The analysis in this section follows directly from Bucovetsky’s analysis of a federation
between two nations. The players are nation A and nation B. Since a nation is the union of
two regions, the per capita income within a nation is the same for all agents, regardless of
their residency. Thus, all agents in an independent nation in the good state of nature (state
H) would obtain the income level q, while in the bad state of nature (state L), they would
obtain the income level 1.
Under a federation of nation A and nation B agents are able to migrate within the
federation. Some agents from the nation in the bad state of nature will migrate to the other
nation, where residents, regardless where they came from, equally share the total income
q. The equilibrium migration condition (Eq. (4) in Bucovetsky) is
q
1þ nn  c ¼
1
1 nn ð1Þ7
where nn is the net flow of migrants from the unlucky to the lucky nation. This condition
means that per capita income in the lucky nation net of migration costs should equal that of
the unlucky nation. This should hold for the marginal migrant. We will denote by Cj per
capita income, after migration takes place, for residents in a nation in the j state of nature,
ja{H, L}. This means that the above condition could be written as
CH  c ¼ CL: ð2Þ
Expected utility under the federation of nations for the rich nation A is
EUFNA ¼ pU CHð Þ þ 1 pð ÞU CLð Þ ð3Þ
and for B, the poor nation, expected utility is
EUFNB ¼ 1 pð ÞU CHð Þ þ pU CLð Þ: ð4Þ
Note that existence of a strictly positive migration cost prevents from full equalization
of income levels across nations. Original residents of a nation in state of nature H end up
with an income level greater than the one obtained by agents from the other nation. And,
clearly, all agents from the nation with the state of nature L obtain the same net income, i.e.
the ones that migrate to the rich nation obtain the same (net) income as the ones that do not
migrate. In the extreme case of no migration costs, c =0, the income of all agents would be
equalized and a federation would coincide with a union of nations.
Since a centralized nation always equalizes the income across its regions it is natural to
assume that the immigration flow nn is equally shared by the two regions conforming the
nation.12 Thus, under the scenario FN each region of the lucky nation receives the
migration flow (nn/2).
3.4. Federation of regions
Now we suppose that the decision makers are the regions. The agreement to be analyzed
here is the federation of the all four regions (FR). We do not consider the possibility of a
partial federation of two or three regions. It is also important to notice that our analysis of a
federation of regions is not equivalent to the analysis of a federation of four bsmallerQ
nations, because the two regions of a nation share a bnational shockQ in their resources.
Under a federation, agents are free to migrate from one region to another. There are no
transfers so that the vector of total income levels obtained by the regions after the
realization of the national and regional shocks is {YHH, YHL, YLH, YLL}. In this case, the
migration equilibrium is more difficult to characterize. The difficulties come from the fact
that, in principle, migration could take place among any combination of regions.
It is clear, however, that there is always migration from the unlucky region in the
unlucky nation to the lucky region in the lucky nation. In this case, a necessary condition
for migration equilibrium is
YHH
1=2þ nHH  c ¼
YLL
1=2 nLL ð5Þ
where nLL is the flow of migrants from the unlucky region in the unlucky nation and nHH
the total flow of immigrants to the lucky region in the lucky nation. Denoting by Cij per12 This assumption is introduced to simplify the analysis and the main results of the paper do not depend on it.
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capita consumption in the region with state of nature ij, we could rewrite the above
expression as CHHc =CLL.
Let EUz
FR be the expected utility under the federation of regions for region z, za{A1,
A2, B1, B2}. One can show that under a federation of regions the expected utility for A1 is
higher than the expected utility for any other region. More precisely
EUFRA1zEU
FR
z ; za A2; B1; B2f g: ð6Þ
This is an important inequality which will be used when comparing the federation and
the union of regions and it is easily obtained by an standard application of first order
stochastic dominance.4. The national versus the regional economy
In this section we start comparing the economy with regions as the decision makers
with the economy with nations as the decision makers. Let cm be the lowest value of the
migration cost such that none wants to migrate under the FN arrangement. We want to
consider cases in which migration flows are positive, so we will assume migration costs
lower than cm.
The first of our results shows that per capita income for the region in state HH and for
the region in LL, after the migration flows have taken place, is smaller in the federation of
regions than in the federation of nations. That is:
Lemma 1. Let (A.1) and (A.2) hold. Let cbcm. Then, i) CHH bCH, ii) CLLbCL.
The intuition behind this result is that the dispersion of per capita incomes is larger in
the economy with fiscally autonomous regions and this yields more migration and the
lucky region in the lucky nation receives more immigration in the federation of regions
(FR) than in the federation of nations (FN). It follows that the per capita income of that
region is lower under FR than under FN.
Our second result regarding the economy with regions is that the expected utility of the
richest region, A1, in FR is increasing with the difference between its expected income and
the expected income of region A2. That is, it is increasing in p.
Lemma 2. Let (A.1) and (A.2) hold. Let 0Vcbcm. Then EUFRA1 is increasing in p (strictly
increasing if 0bcbcm).
This Lemma will be useful to obtain our main results as it implies that increasing
regional income dispersion increases the expected utility of the richest region in a
federation of regions. However, the expected utility of that region in a federation of nations
remains constant upon changes in regional income dispersion.
Bucovetsky? (1998)? shows? that,? for? a? degree? of? relative? risk? aversion? b?N?2,13? the?
expected?utility?of?a?nation?under?a?federation?is?a?quasi-concave?function?of?the?migration13
Following?Shiller?and?Athanasoulis?(1995),?b?=?3? represents?a?bconsensus?by?many?who?work? in? this? topicQ.
This?is?also?the?average?of?the?estimates?reported?in?Friend?and?Blume?(1975).?Therefore?assuming?b?N?2?is?not?an?
unrealistic? assumption.? See? Campbell? (1999)? for? a? summary? on? the? empirical? evidence? on? the? values? of? the?
coefficient?of? risk?aversion.
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cost c. The third result states that the expected utility of a region under FR is also quasi-
concave on c, for cz0. Thus, we have14:
Lemma 3. Let (A.1) and (A.2) hold. Let 0Vcbcm and bN2. Then EUFRA1 is a quasi-
concave function of c.5. When will regions prefer more integration than nations?
We want to analyze the different incentives for fiscally autonomous regions and for
centralized nations in forming a supranational Union or Federation. The poor nation, B,
always prefers a union of nations UN to a federation of nations FN. This is due to
the fact that under UN each nation gets the per capita income (1+q)/2 for sure
whereas in the FN regime B faces a lottery with expected value lower than (1+q)/2.
Nation A, however, might or might not prefer the union to the federal regime depending
on the value of the different parameters of our economy. It might even be the case
that A prefers separation to FN. To rule out this possibility, i.e. to guarantee
what Bucovetsky calls Individual Rationality of the Union, we impose the following
condition
(A.3). qb1z p
1p.
It is easy to show that the above inequality implies EUUNA zEUA
S.15 In this case, both
nations prefer the Union to Separation.
If nation A prefers UN to FN (and (A.3) holds so that UN is Individually Rational) we
conclude that the Union of Nations is a Pareto dominant arrangement and, consequently,
both nations should be in favor of it. If, on the contrary, A prefers FN to UN then the two
nations have different interests and the Union of Nations is less likely to be implemented
than in the previous case.
The goal is to characterize in which cases fiscally autonomous regions (centralized
nations) would unanimously agree on forming a Union, while, if the players were
centralized nations (fiscally autonomous regions), only the poor nation (region) would be
in favor of the Union.
Let the migration cost take the value c and the probability that a rich region gets the
lucky state be p. From now on we explicitly write the expected utility as a function of c
and p. For example, we write EUFNA (c) and EU
FR
Rj
(c, p).16
We write UR(c, p)dUN(c) if at (c, p) a Union is Pareto superior to a Federation for the
regions, but not for the nations. In the case in which the Union is Pareto superior to a
Federation for the regions and for the nations we write UR(c, p)~UN(c). We also write
UR(c, p)~UN(c) to denote the case in which a Union is not Pareto superior for either the14 The proof is inspired in the technics used by Bucovetsky. In our case, however, the possibility of many
migration flows makes the proof more complex and elaborated.
15
See?Bucovetsky? (1998).
16 The first expression does not contain p since the expected utility for nations is independent of such
probability.
10
nations or for the regions. We write UR(c, p)vUN(c) when either d or ~ holds or,
equivalently, when UN(c)dUR(c, p) does not hold. This motivates the following
definition.
Definition. We say that, for a given value of p, a Union is more likely to be implemented
when the regions are the players than when the nations are the players, and write
UR( p)vUN, whenever UR(c, p)vUN(c) for all c (in the opposite case we write
UNvUR( p)).
Therefore, when the economy is such that UR( p)vUN we can say that the regions are
more favorable to form a Union than the nations. Note that UR( p)vUN might hold for
some, but not all, values of p. Next we state our main result.
Proposition 1. Let (A.1)–(A.3) hold. Let 0Vcbcm and bN2. Then there exists a level of
p*, 1/2Vp*V1, such that we have UR(p)vUN for pbp* and UNvUR(p) for pzp*.
Moreover, if p/(1p)Nq we know that p*N1/2, and YLHz (1+q)/2 is a suficient
condition for p*b1. The cut-off value p* is independent of c.
Sketch? of? the?Proof.?Consider? the? case? in?which?UN? is? not? always? a? Pareto? dominant?
regime? (the? general? case? is? analyzed? in? the? formal? proof? provided? in? the?Appendix).? In?
Figs.?1? and?2,?we? show? expected?utilities?of? the? richest?nation? and? the? richest? region,? as?
function? of? the?migration? costs,? for? the? federation? regime? and? the? global? union.? In? the?
formal?proof?we?show?that?for?p?close?to?1/2?(case?represented?in?Fig.?1),?expected?utility?of?
A1?in? the?FR? intersects?the?expected?utility?level?EUU? at?a? lower?value?of?c? (we?call? it?c)?
than? the? value? c¯? at? which? expected? utility? of? A? in? the? FN? intersects? the? level? EUU.? ?
????????????
????????
???
??
Fig. 1. Expected utilities of the richest nation and the richest region.
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??
???
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???
??
Fig. 2. Expected utilities of the richest nation and the richest region. The cut-off value p*.Therefore, for all c in (c, c¯) we know that EUFNA (c)NEU
UzEUFRA1(c, p). For the rest of
values for c either EUFNA (c)NEU
U and EUFRA1(c, p)NEU
U (for c bc) or EUFNA (c)bEU
U and
EUFRA1(c, p)bEU
U (for c N c¯).
We?know,?by?Lemma?2,? that?expected?utility?of? the? richest? region? in?FR? is? increasing?
with?p.?However,?expected?utility?of? the? richest?nation?does?not?depend?on?p.?Therefore?
one?could?intuitively?think?that,?as?p? increases,?EUFRA1(c,?p)?shifts?and?that?for?some?level?
of?p? large?enough? the?situation? in?Fig.?1?could?be? reversed,?so? that? for?all?c? in?an? interval?
we?have?EUAFN(c)?bEUU?VEUFRA1(c,?p).?We? show? in? the? formal?proof? that? this? reversal?
happens?for?p? smaller? than?1.
Given? that?EUFRA1(c,?p)? is? strictly? increasing? in?p? it? is?also?easy? to? show? that? there? is?
a?cut-off?value?p*? such? that? this? reversal?happens.?This?cut-off?value? is? the?one? in?Fig.?2?
in?which?EUFRA1(c,?p*)?=?EUAFN(c)= ?EUU?holds?for?one?c.?From?our?reasoning,?it?is?easy?
to?see?that? the?cut-off?value?p*? lies?between?1/2?and?1.
Thus when the regions of a nation are similar enough to each other in expected terms
(small values of p) we claim that a global union is more likely to be achieved when the
players are fiscally autonomous regions than when the players are centralized nations.
However, if the degree of diversity between regions in a nation is large enough (high
values of p), then the opposite result is true. This result could be interpreted as saying
that fiscally autonomous regions have more incentives than centralized nations to form a
full global union when regional risk-sharing is the main reason for a fiscal agreement
and the associated cost in terms of redistribution among regions is not that important.
When, on the other hand, the income differences between the poor and the rich regions
are very important (high values of p), achieving more integration is easier if nations are
the decision makers. Notice that when p is high the inter-regional transfers in a12
centralized nation can be seen more as pure redistribution than as risk-sharing between
regions.
We?cannot?exclude?the?possibility?that?both?nations?and?regions?consider?instrumenting?
transfers?(see?Bucovetsky,?1998?for?a?good?discussion?of?transfers?in?this?type?of?economy)?
that? replicate? an? agreement? closer? to? a?union? than? to? a? federation.?Given? that?migration?
takes? resources,? in? case? separation? is? not? preferred? to? federation? and? union,? there?will?
always?be?a?transfer?scheme?in?which?there?are?enough?transfers?to?prevent?any?migration?
and? some? extra? resources? (the? cost? of?migration)? are? distributed? among? the? regions? or?
nations.?However,?this?type?of?efficiency?enhancing?transfer?has?to?be?made?ex?post?to?the?
realization? of? uncertainty? and? they? would? not? change? the? nature? of? our? economic?
conclusions? in? terms?of? the? fiscal? integration?achieved.
The type of transfers that we will discuss in the next paragraphs are ex ante
transfers, i.e. implemented before the realization of the state of nature, and the nations
(or regions) could agree on them and on the type of fiscal agreement at the same time.
Consider the case c bc b c¯ and p bp* (a similar argument can be made for p Np*) and
suppose that a Union is not always a Pareto dominant regime for the nations. Here all
regions prefer a unitary agreement to a federation whereas only the poor nation prefers
the union to the federation. One can consider the possibility of an intermediate
agreement where the two nations form a bUnionQ but with some additional transfers. In
this case, some transfers have to be made from the poor to the rich country (which
prefers a Federation to a Union) and so a bfull UnionQ would not be achieved. Thus, in this
case, our results are robust to the introduction of additional transfers between nations or
regions.
In?the?case?c?b?c?both?the?poor?region?and?the?poor?nation?prefer?a?situation?in?which?a?
Union? is? achieved? and? both? are?willing? to?make? a? positive? transfer? or? bfeeQ? to? the? rich?
region?or? to? the? rich?nation,? respectively.? In? that?case,? the?amount?of? the? transfer?needed?
would?be?negatively?correlated?with?the?degree?of?integration?achieved.?I.e.,?full?integration?
is?achieved?when? that? transfer? is?zero?and?no? integration? is?achieved?when? the? transfer? is?
such? that? there? is?no? expected?net? transfer? from? the? rich? area? to? the?poor? area.?We?may?
consider? the?minimum? transfer? needed? to? convince? a? rich? nation? to? be? part? of? a?Union.?
Define?C*?as?the?solution?to?U(C)=EUAFN?(i.e.?the?certainty?equivalent?to?a?federation?from?
the?point?of?view?of?nation?A).?Then,?nation?B?would?need?to?pay?to?nation?A?a?bfeeQ?of?at?
least?C*?(1?+?q)/2?to?convince?it?to?form?a?Union.?In?that?case,?nation?A?is?exactly?as?well?
off?as?in?a?Federation.?Then?to?compare?the?maximum?integration?achieved?in?the?economy?
with?nations?with? the?integration?achieved? in?the?economy?with?regions,?we?can?calculate?
the?certainty?equivalents?to?a?federation?in?each?case.?The?economy?with?a?larger?certainty?
equivalent?will? result? in? less? integration,? as? it? requires? a? higher? fee? and? consequently? a?
lower?amount?of?net? transfers.?Just? looking?at?Fig.?1?one?can?see? that?which? fee? is?higher?
depends?on?the?parameters?of?the?model.?For?migration?costs?high?enough?(although?lower?
than?c)?one?has?EUAFN?zEUFRA1? (this? is?a?general?result? that? is?provided? in? the?proof?of? the?
proposition),? so? in? the? economy? of? centralized? nations? a? higher? fee? is? needed? and?
consequently? less? integration? is?obtained.?However,? as? the? example?of?Fig.?1? shows,? for?
low?enough?migration?costs? the?opposite? result?would?be?obtained.?This?means? that?only?
for? low?enough?migration?costs?our? results?may?not?be? robust? to? introduction?of?ex?ante?
transfers.13
6. Final comments
We have analyzed the circumstances under which two centralized nations would choose
a supranational fiscal agreement implying different integration levels than the fiscal
agreement that would have been chosen by the regions forming those nations, if the
regions were given enough fiscal autonomy. Our analysis yields some interesting political
conclusions about the role of fiscally autonomous regions versus centralized nations in the
formation of supranational economic areas. The claim that autonomous regions have more
incentives than centralized nations to form a full global union is likely to be correct when
nations are economic stable arrangements, i.e. when p is low so that it is in the interests of
the rich region to be part of a centralized nation. In this case, regional risk-sharing is the
main reason for a national fiscal agreement and the associated cost in terms of
redistribution among regions is not that important. When, on the other hand, it is not
on the interest of a rich region to be part of a nation (high values of p), achieving a full
supranational union will be easier if nations are the decision makers. Thus, the claim that
regions have stronger incentives than nations to form a supranational union might be true
only in the case regions have also strong incentives to be part of a centralized nation.
An interesting situation that has not been explicitly analyzed in this paper is the one in
which A1, the richest region, prefers separation both to a federation of regions and to a
union. In this case, it might also happen that region A1 would be better off on its own than as
a member of nation A. It is easy to see that this is more likely to happen when p is very high.
Thus, since in this case the union with A2 was not in its interest, one can think of region A1
as been bforcedQ, by non-economic reasons, to be member of nation A. Therefore, when the
original nations are sustained by non-economic reasons, were their regions asked, the
richest regions could even choose separation to any other fiscal agreement. We should not
conclude, however, that whenever the nations are more in favor of the supranational union
than the regions, i.e. whenever UR( p)UN happens, the richest region is being forced to
be part of its nation, since it is easy to provide numerical examples for which p is high and
the rich region is better off being part of its nation than on its own and still UR( p)UN.
We have not considered the possibility of a partial union or federation of one, two, or
three regions. If this type of agreements were considered, a federation or a union of the
three richer regions, excluding the poorest one, would always be preferred by those three
regions to a federation or union of the four regions.
We?have?used?a?very?simple?model?with?a?representative?agent?in?each?region.?It?is?true?
that? with? heterogeneous? agents? migration? and? transfers? have? very? different? effects? on?
welfare.?It?could?happen?that?migration?redistributes?risk?among?the?population?in?a?nation?
(or? region)? in? such? a? way? that? it? is? always? a? worse? risk-sharing? device? than? the? one?
provided?by? transfers? (see?Wildasin,?1995).?The? analysis?of? a?model?with?heterogeneous?
agents? is? left? for? future? research.Acknowledgments
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Proof of Lemma 1. We first make the three following remarks about the consumption
equilibrium values:
a) CHHc =CLL; CHc =CL
b) NHHCHH+NHLCHL+NLLCLL+NLHCLH=CH+CL
c) CLHzCLL
where Nij stands for the total population in region ij under the FR equilibrium. Part a) was
already explained in the description of the possible agreements. Part b) states that the total
income in the FR case and in the UN case is the same. Inequality c) follows from the fact
that the income in LH is greater than in LL and the agents in region LH can always
bimitateQ what agents in region LL do, i.e., agents in LH start with a higher income than
agents in LL and cannot end up, after migration flows take place, with a lower income than
agents in LL.
The proof of statement i) is divided in two parts depending on the magnitude of c. The
statement in ii) follows easily from the first statement and remark a).
PART A. Suppose that 1+cVqc
There are two cases depending on the nature of the migration flows.
(1) Consider first the case in which regions HH and HL both receive immigrants
at equilibrium.
It is clear that the income per capita must be the same in both regions, i.e.
CHH=CHL, otherwise the last immigrants in the region with lower income
per capita would had been better off by migrating to the other region.
Suppose that CHHNCH Then we also have that CHLNCH. By the equality in
observation a) we have that CLLNCL. This inequality and c) imply that
CLHNCL. Thus, in the FR case the per capita income in each region is higher
than the corresponding national per capita income in the UN case. It is not
difficult to see that in this case equality b) cannot hold. It follows that
CHHVCH.
(2) Consider now the case in which only region HH receives immigrants at
equilibrium.
a) We first prove that migration must go from region LL to region HH i.e.,
there is no migration from region LH. Suppose to the contrary. In this
case, there would be migration from regions LL and LH to region HH.
Let nHH be the total number of immigrants received by HH. It helps to
imagine migration as a process in which first all immigrants are from
the poorest region, LL. When the level of migration is high enough
the per capita income in LL reaches the level of per capita income in15
LH, and from that moment on there is also migration from the region
LH. It is clear that always exists such a number of immigrants from
region LL that makes the per capita income in both regions equal, i.e.
there exists nVnHH such that
1þ c ¼ 1 c
1 2n : ð7Þ
We want to show that for such a level of immigrants, n, the per capita
income in region HH is lower or equal than the per capita income in
region HL. To see it, suppose the contrary so that
qþ c
1þ n Nq c: ð8Þ
Solving from n in equality Eq. (7) we get n =2c/(1+c). Then inequality
Eq. (8) can be written as
qþ c
1þ 2c
1þc
Nq cor
qb
2c2
1þc þ 2c
2c
1þc
ð9Þ
and inequality Eq. (9) implies
qb1þ 2c
which contradicts the first assumption on this Part A) of the proof.b) The result above showed that the migration flow goes from region LL to
region HH. Thus, none in region LH migrates.
The equilibrium migration under FN is given by condition Eq. (2)
q
1þ nn  c ¼
1
1 nn
and the equilibrium migration under FR is given by condition Eq. (5), that
can be written as
qþ cð Þ
1þ 2nr  c ¼
1 cð Þ
1 2nr : ð5VÞ
Assuming our particular value of cV (q1)/2, and by simply comparing
the numerators of condition Eq. (2) and the modified condition Eq. (5V),
we conclude that 2nrNnn. Recall that it was assumed that the in the UN
case region HH gets (nn)/2 immigrants. Thus, the number of immigrants
that region HH gets in the FR case, nr, is higher than what it gets under
UN, (nn)/2.16
In this particular case, the total per-capita income to be distributed
between the region in state of nature HH and the region in state of
nature LL (and also in nations H and L) is (1+q)/2. Thus, we have the
identity
CHHNHH þ CLL 1 NHHð Þ ¼ 1þ qð Þ=2
where 1 is the total population of the two regions and NHH the
percentage of that total living in the region in state of nature HH,
0VNHHV1. Since CHHc =CLL we also have
CHHNHH þ CHH  cð Þ 1 NHHð Þ ¼ 1þ qð Þ=2
so CHH=(1+q)/2+c(1NHH). The same identity holds for CH, CL and
NH. Thus, per-capita income in the region in state HH increases as the
population of the other region increases. That is, it decreases with
migration. This implies that in the federation of regions, where migration
to the region in state HH is higher than under the federation of nations, the
region in state HH ends up with a lower level of per capita income than
under the federation of nations.PART B. Suppose that 1+c Nqc.
This part is proven by similar steps to the ones in Part A and we omit it. It onlyrequires to realize that now, regarding to the migration flows, region LH plays a
similar role to region HL in the previous part. 5Proof of Lemma 2. We have that
EUFRA1 pð Þ ¼ p pU CHHð Þþ 1 pð ÞU CHLð Þð Þ þ 1 pð Þ pU CLHð Þ þ 1 pð ÞU CLLð Þð Þ
We want to show that
dEUFR
A1
pð Þ
dp
is positive. Recalling that CHHzCHL and CLHzCLL, we
conclude that,
dEUFRA1 pð Þ
dp
¼ p U CHHð Þ  U CHLð Þð Þ þ 1 pð Þ U CLHð Þ  U CLLð Þð Þ0:
When c N0 at least one of the previous inequalities has to be strict so that
dEUFR
A1
pð Þ
dp
N0. 5
Proof of Lemma 3. We consider the case in which regions HH and HL both receive
immigrants from regions LL and LH. The rest of cases can be proven in a similar way by
setting the corresponding migration values equal to zero.
It has been shown in the Proof of Lemma 1 that when HH and HL both receive
migrants the per capita consumption in region HH has to be equal to the per capita
consumption in region HL. Let nHH be the number of immigrants in region HH and nHL
the number of immigrants in region HL. At equilibrium we have
CHHu
YHH
1
2
þ nHH
¼ YHL
1
2
þ nHL
uCHL: ð10Þ17
It follows from Eq. (10) that
nHH ¼ YHH  YHL
2
þ YHH
YHL
nHL: ð11Þ
It is easy to see that if there is migration from region LL and from region LH the
consumption (per capita) in these two regions must be the same. Let nHH denote the
migration from HH and nHL the migration from LH. At equilibrium we have
CLLu
YLL
1
2
 nLL
¼ YLH
1
2
 nLH
uCLH ð12Þ
so that
nLL ¼ YLH  YLL
2
þ YLL
YLH
nLH: ð13Þ
It follows from Eq. (11) and Eq. (13) that
nHHV ¼ YHH
YHL
nHLV ; nHHW ¼ YHH
YHL
nHLW ð14Þ
and
nLLV ¼ YLL
YLH
nLHV ; nLLW ¼ YLL
YLH
nLHW ð15Þ
We also have that
nHH þ nHL ¼ nLL þ nLH ð16Þ
which, together with Eq. (14) and Eq. (15), imply
nHLV ¼ k nLHV ð17Þ
and
nHLW ¼ k nLHW ð18Þ
where k ¼ YLLþYLH
YLH
 
= YHLþYHH
YHL
 
.
From the definitions of EUFRA1, CHH, CHL, CLH and CLL we have that
BEUFRA1
Bc
¼  ppU V CHHð Þ nHH
V YHH
1
2
 nHH
 2  p 1 pð ÞU V CHLð Þ nHLV YHL
1
2
þ nHL
 2
þ 1 pð Þ 1 pð ÞU V CLLð Þ nLL
V YLL
1
2
 nLL
 2 þ 1pð ÞpU V CLHð Þ nLHV YLH
1
2
nLH
 2 :
ð19Þ18
Differentiating again with respect to c
B
2EUFRA1
Bc2
¼ Aþ pp UW CHHð Þ
nHHV YHH
 	2
1
2
þ nHH
 2 þ U V CHHð Þ 2 nHH
V
 	2
YHH
1
2
þ nHH
 3
0
BBB@
1
CCCA
þ p 1 pð Þ UW CHLð Þ
nHLV YHL
 	2
1
2
þ nHL
 2 þ U V CHLð Þ 2 nHL
V
 	2
YHL
1
2
þ nHL
 3
0
BBB@
1
CCCA
þ 1 pð Þ 1 pð Þ UW CLLð Þ
nLLV YLL
 	2
1
2
 nLL
 2 þ U V CLLð Þ 2 nLL
V
 	2
YLL
1
2
 nLL
 3
0
BBB@
1
CCCA
þ 1 pð Þp UW CLHð Þ
nLHV YLH
 	2
1
2
 nLH
 2 þ U V CLHð Þ 2 nLH
V
 	2
YLH
1
2
 nLH
 3
0
BBB@
1
CCCA
ð20Þ
where
Au ppU V CHHð Þ nHH
W YHH
1
2
þ nHH
 2  p 1 pð ÞU V CHLð Þ nHLW YHL
1
2
þ nHL
 2
þ 1 pð Þ 1 pð ÞU V CLLð Þ nLL
W YLL
1
2
 nLL
 2 þ 1 pð ÞpU V CLHð Þ nLHW YLH
1
2
 nLH
 2
and by equalities Eqs. (10), (11), (14) and Eq. (18) we can rewrite A as
Au pU V CHHð Þ p
YHH
YHL
YHH
1
2
þ nHH
 2 þ 1 pð Þ YHL
1
2
þ nHL
 2
0
BBB@
1
CCCAk nLHW
þ 1 pð ÞU V CLLð Þ 1 pð Þ
YLL
YLH
YLL
1
2
 nLL
 2 þ p YLH
1
2
 nLH
 2
0
BBB@
1
CCCAnLHW ð21Þ19
and Eq. (19) can be rewritten as
BEUFRA1
B
¼  pU V CHHð Þ p
YHH
YHL
YHH
1
2
þ nHH
 2 þ 1 pð Þ YHL
1
2
þ nHL
 2
0
BBB@
1
CCCAk nLHV
þ 1 pð ÞU V CLLð Þ 1 pð Þ
YLL
YLH
YLL
1
2
 nLL
 2 þ p YLH
1
2
 nLH
 2
0
BBB@
1
CCCAnLHV :
ð22Þ
It follows from Eqs. (21) and (22) that
A ¼ BEU
FR
A1
Bc
nLHW
nLHV
ð23Þ
Thus, whenever
BEUFRA1
Bc
¼ 0 we also have A=0. It follows that at any c such that
BEUFRA1
Bc
¼ 0 Eq. (20) becomes
B
2EUFRA1
Bc2
¼ pUW CHHð Þ p nHH
Vð Þ2Y 2HH
1
2
þ nHL
 4 þ 1 pð Þ nHLVð Þ
2
Y 2HL
1
2
þ nHL
 4
0
BBB@
1
CCCA
þ 1 pð ÞUW CLLð Þ 1 pð Þ nLL
Vð Þ2Y 2LL
1
2
 nLL
 2 þ p nLHVð Þ
2
Y 2LH
1
2
 nLH
 2
0
BBB@
1
CCCA
þ pU V CHHð Þ p 2 nHH
Vð Þ2YHH
1
2
þ nHH
 3 þ 1 pð Þ 2 nHLVð Þ
2
YHL
1
2
þ nHL
 3
0
BBB@
1
CCCA
þ 1 pð ÞU V CLLð Þ 1 pð Þ 2 nLL
Vð Þ2YLL
1
2
 nLL
 3 þ p 2 nLHVð Þ
2
YLH
1
2
 nLH
 3
0
BBB@
1
CCCA ð24Þ20
where we have used the fact that at equilibrium CHH=CHL and CLL=CLH. From the fact
that b ¼ UW xð Þ
U V xð Þ x for all x, and from Eqs. (14) and (15) we can rewrite Eq. (24) as
B
2EUFRA1
Bc2
¼ 2 bð Þ nHLV
 	2
pU V CHHð Þ p
YHH
YHL
 2
CHH
1
2
þ nHH
 2 þ 1 pð Þ CHH
1
2
þ nHL
 2
0
BBB@
1
CCCA
0
BBB@
þ nLHV
 	2
1 pð ÞU VCLHð Þ p
YLL
YLH
 2
CLL
1
2
 nLL
 2 þ 1 pð Þ CLL
1
2
 nLH
 2
0
BBB@
1
CCCA
1
CCCA:
ð25Þ
By assumption b N2, so that Eq. (25) is negative. It follows that B
2EUFR
A1
Bc2
b0 at any c such
that BEU
FR
A1
Bc
¼ 0 which implies that EUFRA1 is quasi-concave. 5
Proof of the Proposition. If the value of q is too large it might happen that, for all positive
values of the migration cost c, a federation is a worse insurance device for nation A than a
union so that EUUzEUA
FN. The following condition implies that there exists values of c
for which such inequality is not true so that UN is not always a Pareto dominant regime,17
p
1 p q:
Thus we will divide the proof of the theorem in two cases. The first will be the one in
which this condition is satisfied. The second will consider the case in which UN is always
Pareto dominant for the nations.
1) Assume p
1pzq is satisfied.
We will show that for small values of p, UR( p)dUN is satisfied whereas for
large values of p, UNdUR( p) is satisfied. Then a continuity argument will
close the proof.
1.a) Consider the extreme case with p =1/2.
We first show that there exists a c and a c¯ so that for every ca (c, c¯) we have
UR(c, 1/2)dUN(c). Recall that EUU ¼ U 1þq
2
 	
. Thus UR(c, 1/2)dUN(c)
iff the inequalities
EUFNA cð ÞNU
1þ q
2
 
ð26Þ
and
EUFRRj c;
1
2
 
VU
1þ q
2
 
for all Rj ð27Þ
hold simultaneously.
By the inequalities given in Eq. (6) we know that Eq. (27) is equivalent to
EUFRA1 c;
1
2
 
VU
1þ q
2
 
: ð28Þ17 See Bucovetsky for the proof of this claim.
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Let c¯ N0 be such that
EUFNA c
Pð Þ ¼ U 1þ q
2
 
: ð29Þ
Existence of c¯ follows from: a) EUFNA (0)=EU
U; b) for cm we have EUFNA (c
m)=EUA
S;
c) by (A.3) EUUNEUSA; d) by continuity of EU
FN
A (c) and; e) since
p
1pzq
there?exists?c˜?such?that?EUAFN(c˜)?NEUU?(see?Fig.?1).
If such c¯ is not unique take the infimum of them. Also realize that condition p
1pzq
guarantees that c¯ N0.
We can write
EUFNA c
Pð Þ ¼ pU PCH
 	þ 1 pð ÞU PCL 	 ð30Þ
where C¯H and C¯L are the equilibrium per capita income levelswhen themigration cost is
c¯. For that c¯ and for p=1/2 we write the expected utility for region A1 in FR as
EUFRA1 c¯;
1
2
 
¼ 1
2
p U C¯HH
 	þU C¯HL 	 	þ 1
2
1pð Þ U C¯LL
 	þU C¯LH 	 	
ð31Þ
so that inequality Eq. (28) holds, for c¯ and p=1/2, if
1
2
p U C¯HH
 	þU C¯HL 	 	þ 1 pð Þ U C¯LL 	þU C¯LH 	 	 	bU 1þ q
2
 
: ð32Þ
Lemma 1 states that CLNCLL and CHNCHH. It follows that
1
2
pU C¯HH
 	þ 1 pð ÞU C¯LL 	 	b 1
2
pU C¯H
 	þ 1 pð ÞU C¯L 	 	 ð33Þ
and from Eqs. (29) and (30) we have
1
2
pU C¯H
 	þ 1 pð ÞU C¯L 	 	 ¼ 1
2
U
1þ q
2
 
: ð34Þ
It follows that
1
2
pU C¯HH
 	þ 1 pð ÞU C¯LL 	 	b 1
2
U
1þ q
2
 
: ð35Þ
The next step is to show that
1
2
pU C¯HL
 	þ 1 pð ÞU C¯LH 	 	b 1
2
U
1þ q
2
 
: ð36Þ
If there is no migration in regions HL and LH we have that C¯HL ¼ YHL1
2
; C¯LH ¼ YLH1
2
so that C¯HL þ C¯LH ¼ 1þq2 . Since U is concave it follows that Eq. (36) holds. If there
is only migration to region HL we have that C¯HLb
YHL
1
2
and by the previous argument
we again obtain that Eq. (36) holds. It was showed in the proof of Lemma 3 that the
only remaining possibility is that there is migration from region LH and migration to
region HL. In this case, consumption must be such that C¯HL= C¯HH and C¯LL= C¯LH
and by Eq. (35) we again have that inequality Eq. (36) holds. Summing up, we have
shown that Eqs. (35) and (36) always hold.22
Thus Eqs. (35) and (36) imply that Eq. (32) is true and, as a consequence, Eqs. (28)
and (27) also hold for c¯ and p =1/2.
By continuity of EUFRA1(c, 1/2), for a set of values of c smaller than c¯ we have that
Eq. (27) holds true. It only rests to show that for values of c close enough to c¯ and
c b c¯ we have that Eq. (26) is true, i.e. EUFNA cð ÞNU 1þq2
 	
. Since EUFNA (c) is
continuous at c¯ we only need to show that EUFNA (c) is decreasing at c¯. But this
follows from observations a) – e) above. Summing up: we have shown that there
exists a set (cV, c¯) of values of c that satisfy Eqs. (26) and (27) simultaneously, i.e.
for all ca (cV, c¯) we have UR(c, 1/2)dUN(c).
Let c be defined as follows
c ¼ inf c:EUFRA1 c;
1
2
 
¼ U 1þ q
2
 
 
: ð37Þ
By the argument given above we know that EUFRA1 c¯;
1
2
 	
bU 1þq
2
 	
and we also have
that EUFRA1 0;
1
2
 	 ¼ U 1þq
2
 	
. Then, quasi-concavity of EUA1
FR(c, 1/2) implies that
c b c¯. Quasi-concavity also implies that for all ca (c, c¯) we have EUFRA1 c;
1
2
 	
V
U 1þq
2
 	
. Remember that we already showed that EUFNA cð ÞNU 1þq2
 	
for all 0bc bc.
Therefore we have UR(c, 1/2)dUN(c) for all ca (c, c¯).
Next, we show that UR(c, 1/2)~UN(c) for all ca A (c, c¯). Quasi-concavity of the
functions EUFRA1(c, 1/2) and EU
FN
A (c) and the fact that both of them are decreasing at
c¯ imply that EUFRA1 c;
1
2
 	
bU 1þq
2
 	
for all c N c¯ and EUFNA cð ÞVU 1þq2
 	
for all c N c¯. In
this case, a Union is Pareto efficient for both the regions and the nations. Hence we
have UR(c, 1/2)~UN(c) for all c N c¯.
The definition of c and the equalities EUFRA1 0;
1
2
 	 ¼ EUFNA 0ð Þ ¼ U 1þq2 	 and
quasi-concavity of these functions imply that EUFRA1 c;
1
2
 	
NU 1þq
2
 	
for all c bc and
EUFNA cð ÞNU 1þq2
 	
for all c bc. Hence, a Union is not Pareto superior to a Federation
neither for the regions nor for the nations and we have UR(c, 1/2)~UN(c) for all
c bc.
A continuity argument can be used to show that for values of p N1/2 and close
enough to 1/2, we still have UR( p)dUN.
1.b) Now consider the limit case in which p =1. We have
EUFRA1 c; 1ð Þ ¼ pU CHHð Þ þ 1 pð ÞU CLHð Þ:
We want to compare EUFRA1(c¯, 1) to EU
U where the value c¯ is the one given in section
1.a) above By the reasoning in Lemma 1, we know that CHHNCLH. Two cases must
be considered:
i) YLHz
1þq
2
. In this case, it is easy to see that CHHN
1þq
2
and CLHz
1þq
2
(otherwise the total resources wouldn’t add up to 1+q). It follows that EUFRA1(c¯,
1)NEUU for every cz0. Thus, in this case, a Union is never Pareto superior to a
Federation for the regions. However EUFNA (c) is independent of p, and we know
that EUFNA (c)VEU
U for all c N c¯ and EUFNA (c)NEU
U for all c b c¯.
ii) YLHb
1þq
2
. We still have that CHHN
1þq
2
; however, one can easily show that now
CLHV
1þq
2
. Thus, in principle we could have EUFRA1(c¯, 1)bEU
U.
1.c) EUFRA1 is continuous in p and, by Lemma 2, is also strictly increasing in p.
Then, existence of p*N1.2 easily follows from result in section 1.a).23
Let p˜ be the solution to EUFRA1(c¯, p)=EUA
FN(c¯), where c¯ is the one defined in section
1.a).?It?is?easy?to?check?that?p*?is?given?by?Min{1,?p˜?}?(see?Fig.?2).?Notice?that?two
cases are possible. When the condition in part i) of section 1.b) holds we have that
p*= p˜ b1. When part ii) of such condition holds it might happen that p˜ N1 and in that
case p*=1. Thus, we know that a sufficient condition for p*b1 is that YLHz
1þq
2
.2) Assume now that UN is always Pareto dominant for the nations, i.e. p
1p bq.
For c =0 a Union will give the same expected utility as that of any kind of Federation.
Therefore, for costless migration EUFRA1(0, p)=EU
FN
A (0)=EU
U. Since EUFNA (c)VEU
U for
all cz0, quasi-concavity of EUFNA (c) implies that EU
FN
A (c) is decreasing. If EU
FR
A1(c, p)
is increasing (decreasing) in c at c =0, by quasi-concavity, we have UNvUR( p)
(UN UR( p)). Thus, we need to show that there exists p* such that for all p bp* the
function EUFRA1(0, p) is decreasing in c, and for p Np* the function EU
FR
A1(0, p) is
increasing in c.
From the definitions of EUFRA1, CHH, CHL and CLL,
BEUFRA1 0; pð Þ
Bc
¼  pU V CHHð Þ p
YHH
YHL
YHH
1
2
þ nHH
 2 þ 1 pð Þ YHL
1
2
þ nHL
 2
0
BBB@
1
CCCAk nLHV
þ 1pð ÞU V CLLð Þ 1pð Þ
YLL
YLH
YLL
1
2
nLL
 2 þp YLH
1
2
nLH
 2
0
BBB@
1
CCCAnLHV :
ð38Þ
However, when c =0 we know that free migration leads to
CHH ¼ CHL ¼ CLH ¼ CLL
which is equivalent to
YHH
1
2
þ nHH
¼ YHL
1
2
þ nHL
¼ YLH
1
2
 nLH
¼ YLL
1
2
 nLL
: ð39Þ
This implies that we could write Eq. (22) as
BEUFRA1 0; pð Þ
Bc
¼ nLHV U V CHHð ÞCHH
 pp YHH
YHL
1
2
þ nHH
þ p 1 pð Þ k
1
2
þ nHL
0
B@
þ 1 pð Þ 1 pð Þ
YLL
YLH
1
2
 nLL
þ 1 pð Þp 1
1
2
 nLH
1
CA: ð40Þ24
Consider the case where p =1:
BEUFRA1 0; 1ð Þ
Bc
¼ nLHV cð ÞU V CHHð ÞCHH
 p YHH
YHL
1
2
þ nHH
þ 1 pð Þ 1
1
2
 nLH
0
B@
1
CA: ð41Þ
Given that nVLH(c)V0, p N1/2 and by the equalities in Eq. (39) this derivative is always
positive.
Now consider the extreme case where p =1/2, so
BEUFRA1 0;
1
2
 
Bc
¼ nLHV cð ÞU V CHHð ÞCHH 1
2
 p YHH
YHL
1
2
þ nHH
þ 1 pð Þ 1
1
2
 nLH
0
B@
 p k
1
2
þ nHL
þ 1 pð Þ
YLL
YLH
1
2
 nLL
1
CA: ð42Þ
The sign of the above derivative is not determined. However, from Eqs. (41) and (42)
we know that
BEUFRA1 0;1ð Þ
Bc
N
BEUFRA1 0;
1
2
 
Bc
ð43Þ
iff
 p k
1
2
þ nHL
þ 1 pð Þ
YLL
YLH
1
2
 nLL
N 0: ð44Þ
Since k ¼ YHLqYLH and by the equalities in Eq. (39), inequality Eq. (44) is equivalent to
1 pð Þ
p
N
1
q
ð45Þ
and by the first assumption in this part of the proof Eq. (45) always holds. Thus, inequality
Eq. (43) also holds.
Lemma 2, inequality Eq. (43) and that fact that the utility function is continuous as a
function of p and c are enough to guarantee the existence of p* such that: i) if
BEUFR
A1
0; 1
2ð Þ
Bc
z
0 we have p*=1/2 and UNdUR( p) for all p, ii) if BEUFRA1 0; 12ð Þ
Bc
b0 then p*N1/2 and for
pVp* we have UR( p)~UN and for all p Np* we have UR( p)dUN. 5References
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